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I. Introduction
No one is a stranger to the steady decline of the music industry
that has occurred throughout the past decade as a result of online
music piracy. The music industry can be equated to a slowly dying
dinosaur, an ancient remnant that cannot adapt to the changing
environment, but is determined to destroy everything in its wake as it
meets its demise. As online music piracy becomes easier and more
# University of California, Hastings College of the Law, J.D. Candidate 2010;
University of California, Los Angeles, B.A. in Mass Communications Studies, with
Political Science and Music History, 2005. Shana would like to thank Professor John L.
Diamond for his guidance and advice in writing this note. She would also like to thank her
family and friends for their support.
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pervasive, the music industry continues to suffer from lost revenues,
despite employing different battle tactics against its enemies, the
internet music pirates.' While legal music downloading is a growing
industry, the number of illegally shared music files has remained
steady. The recording industry justifies its vigorous legal campaign
against alleged file sharers with claims of billions of dollars in lost
revenue.3 The most infamous and highly publicized aspect of the
music industry's demise is the reign of terrorizing lawsuits against
peer-to-peer file sharers using P2P programs, such as KaZaA or
LimeWire.
The first 261 lawsuits against individuals accused of copyright
infringement were filed on September 8, 2003.' While the total
number of lawsuits filed to date is uncertain, industry analysts have
estimated about 35,000 people have been sued by various record
labels.' The public only hears about a fraction of these lawsuits
because almost all of them are settled out of court on preliminary
decisions, with the defendants typically owing between $3,000 and
$11,000.6
In early 2007, the Recording Industry Association of
America ("RIAA") also started a controversial campaign of sending
"prelitigation" letters to universities, directed towards specific IP
addresses suspected of peer-to-peer file sharing.7 If the university

1. RIAA: For Students Doing Reports, http://www.riaa.com/faq.php (last visited
Mar. 3, 2009).
2.

Eric Bangeman, Pass or Fail? RIAA's College Litigation Campaign Turns One,

ARS TECHNICA, Feb. 27, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2008/02/riaacollege-lawsuit-anniversary.ars.
3. RIAA: For Students Doing Reports, supra note 1.
4. Posting of John Borland to ZDNET NEWS & BLOGS, http://news.zdnet.com/21003513_22-131453.html (Sept. 8, 2003, 05:57:00 p.m.)
5. Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 19, 2008,

available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html.

This number was later disputed by the RIAA, claiming to have only sued 18,000
individuals. The justification for the disparity in the numbers is questionable, and
probably does not take into account those who have been targeted outside of the legal
court process. Nate Anderson, Has the RIAA sued 18,000 people... or 35,000?, ARS
TECHNICA, Jul.

18, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/has-the-riaa-

sued-18000-people-or-35000.ars.
6. RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., Sept.
2008, at 5, http://www.eff.org/files/eff-riaa-whitepaper.pdf. If you do the math, this comes
out to potentially hundreds of millions of dollars. See also, posting of David Kravets to
WIRED: BLOG NETWORK, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/08/file-sharer-set.html

#previouspostt (Aug. 18, 2009, 1:09 p.m.).
7. Eric Bangeman, Pass or Fail? RIAA's College Litigation Campaign Turns One,
ARS TECHNICA, Feb. 27, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2008/02/riaa-

college-lawsuit-anniversary.ars.
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administration chooses to comply with the RIAA's request, they
forward the letter to the students assigned to each IP address. 8
The students are informed of the option to settle the claims
against them by making an easy online payment at an RIAA website,
www.P2Plawsuits.com. 9 These questionable online settlements save
the recording industry substantial time and money by not formally
filing cases.1 ° However, it has also been reported that none of the
settlement money acquired on this website has actually been given to
the artists whose work was allegedly infringed." While most of the
defendants who settle do not believe themselves to be guilty, settling
seems to be a less painful and less expensive way to end the
nightmare, rather than hiring lawyers to dispute the claims and
potentially
facing a much larger damage award from a formal
12
lawsuit.

In December 2008, there were reports that the RIAA planned to
stop its litigation campaign against individual file sharers." However,
RIAA watchdog Ray Beckerman reported on his blog that, in
addition to the pending lawsuits that would not be dropped, almost 50
new lawsuits were filed in December 2008 alone. 4 As recently as
May 2009, Beckerman had identified at least 62 additional new
lawsuits filed by the RIAA."5 Confident there are many more than
this, he reported that his search was only curtailed by personal time
constraints.16

While this may sound disturbing on its own, the situation is even
worse. These lawsuits are based on a misinterpretation of law being
propounded by the recording industry, causing a split in the Federal
Circuits and debate amongst judges, lawmakers, scholars, and

8. Id.
9.
10.

RIAA v. The People, supranote 6, at 8.
Id.

11. Posting of David Kravets to WIRED: BLOGS, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/
2008/09/proving-file-sh.html (Sept. 4, 2008, 2:55 p.m.).
12. RIAA v. The People, supranote 6, at 5.
13. See poasting of David Kravets to WIRED: BLOGS, http://www.wired.com/threat
level/2008/12/no-isp-filterin (Dec. 19, 2008,12:45 p.m.). See also McBride & Smith, supra
note 5.
14. RIAA claim not to have filed new cases "for months" is false, http://recording
industryvspeople.blogspot.com/2008 12_01_archive.html#1104859189661357526 (Dec. 19,
2008, 09:55:00 p.m.).
15. Approximately 62 new cases filed by RIAA in April, http:// recordingindustry
vspeople.blogspot.com/2009/05/approximately-62-new-cases-filed-by.html (May 10, 2009,
02:42:00 p.m.).
16. Id.
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lobbyists. 7 Further, the cases and settlements are always based on
statutory, rather than actual damages, often resulting in exorbitant
fines.18 Only two cases have gone to jury trials, and both were highly
publicized and resulted in excessive jury awards.' 9 This note focuses
on Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas (formerly Virgin Records Am. Inc.

v. Thomas), which originally awarded the record company plaintiffs
statutory damages of $220,000 for the copyright infringement of 24
songs. 20 However, a year later, responding to Ms. Thomas' Motion
for a New Trial, Judge Davis from the United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota vacated the judgment, citing a "manifest
error of law" in the court's Jury Instruction No. 15, which defined
what constitutes an infringing distribution of copyrighted material. 2'
The error of law Judge Davis referred to when he vacated the

decision was the "make available" theory of copyright infringement,
which maintains that making copyrighted material available for
distribution constitutes infringement. 2 The recording industry's
lawyers rely on this interpretation of copyright law because the best
evidence they can obtain against an alleged file-sharer is to discover

the contents of a "shared folder" indicating the songs that have been
posted on a peer-to-peer service, like KaZaA. 23 No peer-to-peer file

17. See arguments discussed infra.
18. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2007). The Copyright Act provides for
statutory damages ranging from $750 to $30,000 per infringement if non-willful, and up to
$150,000 per infringement if willful. See also RIAA v. The People, supra note 6, at 5.
19. The highly controversial lawsuit, Sony v. Tenenbaum, concluded in July 2009,
when Judge Nancy Gertner of the District of Massachusetts found Joel Tenenbaum guilty
of 30 counts of copyright infringement, based on his own admission of downloading and
distributing the 30 songs online. In her decision, Judge Gertner was not required to
consider the "make available" theory. Eric Bangeman, Judge: Tenenbaum guilty of
copyright infringement, ARS TECHNICA, Jul. 31, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2009/07/judge-tenenbaum-guilty-of-copyright-infringement.ars.
The jury
found Tenenbaum liable for $675,000, or $22,500 per song, which Judge Gertner plans to
evaluate on Constitutional due process grounds. Ben Sheffner, Oy Tenenbaum! RIAA
wins $675,000, or $22,500 per song, ARS TECHNICA, Jul. 31, 2009, http://arstechnica.
com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/o-tenenbaum-riaa-wins-675000-or-22500-per-song.ars.
20. Gregory Bonzer, RIAA's Landmark Lawsuit: Virgin Records America et al. V.
Thomas, 25 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 23 (citing Virgin Records Am., Inc. v. Thomas, No. 06cv-1497 (D. Minn. Oct. 5, 2007)).
21. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1226-27 (D. Minn. 2008).
Jury Instruction No. 15 read, "The act of making copyrighted sound recordings available
for electronic distribution on a peer-to-peer network, without license from the copyright
owners, violates the copyright owners' exclusive right of distribution, regardless of
whether actual distribution has been shown." Id. at 1213.
22. Id. at 1212.
23. This evidence was usually obtained by investigations done by MediaSentry, who
is now under fire for performing investigations without licenses required in many states
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sharing lawsuit has gone higher than a federal district court, and in
those, the federal circuits are split on whether to accept this theory of
law. Judge Davis' decision to retry Ms. Thomas' case was very likely
influenced by other recent federal district court cases that also
rejected the "make available" theory.24 The case was retried in June
2009 and resulted in a jury award of just under $2 million, which
Thomas' lawyers have already appealed on constitutional grounds."
Unfortunately, the make available theory was not revisited in the
second jury trial,26 so this area of law remains in limbo.
First, this note explains the background of the recording industry
and the history of online music copyright infringement cases, from
lawsuits against file sharing services to lawsuits against file sharing
individuals. Second, this note analyzes the two competing theories of
what is required to prove distribution in a copyright infringement
claim, as well as the cases and theories in support of each. Finally,
this note proposes a solution to the inequity inherent in a federal
circuit split and the injustice of allowing the recording industry to
enforce its copyrights through a false interpretation of the law against
thousands of individuals. While the recording industry has a valid
right and a strong interest in enforcing its copyrights, it should not be
able to manipulate the court system to harass the public with a false
interpretation of copyright law.

and violating local privacy laws. Eric Bangeman, MediaSentry Role in RIAA Lawsuit
Comes Under Scrutiny, ARS TECHNICA, Feb. 3, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
news/2008/02/mediasentry-role-in-riaa-lawsuit-comes-under-scrutiny.ars.
24. CapitolRecords, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1223-24.
25. After Ms. Thomas's retrial in June 2009, a new jury found damages of $1.92
million, or $80,000 per song. The award has been appealed on Constitutional due process
grounds. Fred von Lohmann, Record Labels' $1.9 Million Win in Thomas Retrial
Constitutional?,ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Jun. 18, 2009, http://www.eff.org/

deeplinks/2009/06/record-labels-awarde.
26. While the "make available" language was not used in the jury instructions for the
retrial, the plaintiffs still failed to produce any evidence of actual dissemination by Ms.
Thomas to the public. See Jury awards plaintiffs $1,920,000.00 in Capitol Records v.
Thomas-Rasset, http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2009/06/ ury-awards-plain
tiffs-192000000-in.html (Jun. 19, 2009); Jury Instruction No. 19, available at http://
beckermanlegal.com/pdf/?file=/Lawyer- Copyright-Internet-Lawvirgin-thomas-090618
Jurylnstructions.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2009).
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H. Background
A. The RIAA and Copyright Law

The RIAA is the overarching trade group that represents 90
percent of the U.S. recording industry. 7 An influential Washington
lobbyist, the RIAA is deeply committed to combating illegal online
music piracy,' which it seeks to accomplish by educating the public,
developing innovative legal downloading alternatives, and enforcing
copyrights through litigation. 9 Thus, the RIAA provides the
financial support, legal resources, and strategy behind the peer-topeer file sharing lawsuits.3" However, the lawsuits will always be filed
on behalf of one or a few specific record companies because they are
the actual owners of the allegedly infringed copyrights.3 For lawsuits
that actually proceed to trial, plaintiffs first provide a list of the songs
that they claim to have been infringed.
Capitol Records Inc. v.
Thomas, the central case in this note, was filed over the alleged
infringement of 24 songs owned by seven different record labels.33
Therefore, the full title of the case is Capitol Records Inc.; Sony BMG
Music Entertainment; Arista Records LLQ Interscope Records;
Warner Bros. Records Inc.; and UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Jammie
Thomas.'
Lawsuits filed against individuals for their use of peer-to-peer file

sharing software are based on a theory of copyright infringement that

27. RIAA: Who We Are, http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php (last visited Mar. 3, 2009).
28. RIAA: Piracy: Online and on the Street, http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php
(last visited Mar. 3, 2009).
29. Id.
30. RIAA: For Students Doing Reports, supra note 1.
31. See, e.g., Motown Record Co., LP, et al. v. DePietro, 2007 WL 576284, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 16, 2007); Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 978 (D. Ariz.
2008) (rather than filing the suit directly on behalf of the RIAA, the suit is filed on behalf
of the record companies that own the copyrights of the songs chosen as the subjects of the
particular lawsuit).
32. See, e.g., Virgin Records Am., Inc. v. Thomas: Complaint for Copyright
Infringement: Exhibit A, available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/
minnesot2/mndce/0:2006cv01497/82850/1/1.html. The allegedly infringed songs include
"Now and Forever" by Richard Marx and owned by Capitol Records, Inc., "Bills, Bills,
Bills" by Destiny's Child and owned by Song BMG Music Entertainment, and "Building a
Mystery" by Sarah McLachlan and owned by Arista Records, LLC.
33. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1212 (D. Minn. 2008).
34.

Id.
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has been dubbed the "make available" theory.35
Copyright
infringement stems from violating any of the five exclusive rights
granted to the owner of the copyright, including the right: "(1) to
reproduce the copyrighted work ... (2) to prepare derivative
works... (3) to distribute copies of the work... (4)... to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and (5) ... to display the work
publicly., 36
The "make available" theory posits that making
copyrighted material available for distribution, without actual
distribution, constitutes infringement.37 In the context of online file
sharing cases, the recording industry argues that copyrighted song
files located in a shared folder on an individual's computer are made
available to members of a peer-to-peer network.38 It is likely that the
RIAA has embraced this theory of law because it allows for weaker
types of evidence to be admitted in order to support claims of
infringement. 39 The opposing theory of copyright infringement
requires actual dissemination of copyrighted material in order to
prove a violation of the distribution right. 4' Because it is practically
impossible to catch somebody in the act of transferring a file from one
user to another on a peer-to-peer network,4' this theory of copyright
infringement is inconvenient and understandably disfavored by the
RIAA.42
Tested first in cases against file sharing services and software
makers and then against individual file sharers, the "make available"
theory has enabled record companies to sue for unlawful distribution

35. See, e.g., Steven Seidenberg, Taken Down: Courts torn on whether "making
available" violates distribution rights, INSIDE COUNSEL, July 2008, availableat http://www.
insidecounsel.com/Issues/2008/July%202008/pages/Taken-Down.aspx.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
37. Capitol Records, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1212-13.
38. Id.
39. "I think the RIAA is trying to shape the law by getting favorable rulings in cases
that have not been defended vigorously, where the court does not have the benefit of a
counter-argument," says [Andrew] Bridges, who filed amicus brief in Barker on behalf of
the Computer & Communications Industry Association and the US Internet Industry
Association. Seidenberg, supra note 35.
40. "Infringement of [the distribution right] requires an actual dissemination of either
copies or phonorecords." MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 2 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 8.11[A], at 8-149 (2008).
41. Sarah McBride, Changing Track, RIAA Ditches MediaSentry, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5,
2009, availableat http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123109364085551895.html.
42. "The entertainment companies want a "making available" right because it would
make it cheaper and easier to sue alleged file-sharers." Seidenberg, supra note 35.
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In response to the widespread negative
of their copyrights.43
reactions to its litigation campaign,' the RIAA claims it will not file
any more infringement suits against individuals. 45 Because pending
cases will not be dropped, resolving the circuit split on the "make
available" theory is still an important issue.46
B. The 'ster Cases: Napster, Aimster, and Grokster
In 2000, the first RIAA lawsuit was brought against the
groundbreaking and notorious online music file sharing system,
Napster, on behalf of 18 major U.S. record labels.47 Based on claims
of contributory and vicarious liability, the plaintiffs successfully
obtained a preliminary injunction to prevent Napster from "engaging
in, or facilitating others in copying, downloading, uploading,
transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs' copyrighted musical
compositions and sound recordings.., without express permission of
the rights owner."" On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found the original
injunction to be overbroad and placed the burden on the plaintiffs "to
provide notice to Napster of copyrighted works and files containing
such works available on the Napster file sharing system before
49
Napster has the duty to disable access to the offending content.,
By 2005, multiple cases pending against Napster were heard
together to determine its liability for maintaining a centralized
indexing system of its users' shared song files." The court clarified
that to establish a claim of copyright infringement for distribution, the
plaintiff "must prove that the accused infringer either (1) actually
disseminated one or more copies of the work... or (2) offered to
distribute copies of that work for purposes of further
distribution...."" The court granted Napster summary judgment on

43. Daniel Reynolds, Note, The RIAA Litigation War on File Sharing and
Alternatives More Compatible with Public Morality, 9 MINN. J. L. ScI. & TECH. 977, 98081 (2008).
44. See, e.g., Charles Nelson, How I See It: The RIAA 's Prosecutionof Copyright Law
is Unconstitutional, J. NEW ENG. TECH., Nov. 28, 2008, http://www.masshightech.com/
stories/2008/11/24/editoria]2-The-RIAAs-prosecution-of-copyright-law-is-unconstitutional
.html.
45. McBride & Smith, supra note 5.
46. Id.
47. A&M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
affd in part,rev'd in part,239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
48. Id. at 927.
49. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001).
50. In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 798-99 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
51. Id. at 805.
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this count, finding that Napster's index and its users fell "well short of
meeting the requirements for establishing direct copyright
infringement."52 However, based on the discovery that had been
completed at the time, the court found there was a triable issue of fact
as to Napster's secondary liability for its users' direct infringement.53
Abandoning the centralized index, the next emerging technology
was Aimster, which allowed peer-to-peer file sharing through the
widely popular AOL Instant Messenger ("AIM") program. 4 Despite
the lack of a centralized index, the RIAA still filed suit against the
website operators of Aimster for contributory and vicarious
Aimster
infringement and obtained a preliminary injunction."
appealed the injunction for being overbroad, claiming that its
software had both infringing and non-infringing uses.5 6 However, the
court was not persuaded, due to the relative lack of evidence of such
non-infringing uses, particularly when compared to the extensive
evidence of infringing uses (illegal distribution of copyrighted
material) presented by the plaintiff record companies.57
In the last highly publicized lawsuit against a file sharing software
company, the RIAA sued Grokster, the developer of a software
program capable of peer-to-peer file sharing, independent of a third
party networking program like AIM.5 8 Although the Ninth Circuit
originally found Grokster free from liability for indirect infringement,
due to the peer-to-peer nature of the program, the Supreme Court
reversed.5 9 The Court viewed the evidence strongly against Grokster,
which showed not only that Grokster knew of its users' illegal
infringement, but that Grokster induced, encouraged, and even
profited from its users' illegal file sharing.6' Further, Grokster
actively pursued former Napster users after Napster was shut down,
unquestionably knowing that a court would also deem their activity

52. Id.
53. Id. at 807.
54. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2003).
55. Id. at 645.
56. Id. at 651. This argument comes from the seminal case Sony Corp. of Am., Inc. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), where the Court found Sony not liable
for contributory infringement for making and distributing VCRs because there were
substantial non-infringing uses of the technology.
57. Aimster Copyright, 334 F.3d at 653.
58. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
59. Id. at 928.
60. Id. at 941.
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unlawful.6' Ultimately, Grokster was found "liable for the resulting
acts of infringement by third parties." 62
C. Peer-to-Peer Lawsuits and Jammie Thomas
Despite the RIAA's seemingly successful attacks on illegal file
sharing, the number of files being distributed through peer-to-peer
services was continually growing. 6 While Napster, Aimster, and
Grokster were being shut down, new peer-to-peer services began
popping up with even less involvement in the users' activity, placing
themselves out of the RIAA's legal reach. " Realizing a new strategy
was necessary to combat online file sharing, the RIAA began its legal
crusade against individuals for copyright infringement through illegal
downloading of copyrighted song files.65
In the infringement cases against individual file sharers, the
RIAA sues individuals for uploading, rather than downloading,
copyrighted material. 66 While it is nearly impossible to capture
someone in the act of transmitting a shared file, RIAA investigators
are able to locate "shared" folders on a computer hard drives, which
61
are usually linked to KaZaA or other file sharing services. Were it
technologically feasible to obtain direct evidence of the transfer of
digital files, the "make available" theory would not have been an
issue in this line of cases. 6' Because discovery limitations make it
difficult to uncover evidence of actual dissemination, the RIAA has
decided to aggressively advocate a debatable interpretation of
copyright law, the "make available" theory.69
Cases against individuals start when an RIAA agent trolling
through KaZaA or other peer-to-peer listings detects the sharing of
copyrighted songs and determines the Internet Protocol ("IP")

61.
62.
63.

Id. at 925.
Id. at 936-37.
Sudip Bhattacharjee, Ram D. Gopal, Kaveenpan Lertwachara & James R.

Marsden, Piracy and File Sharing, Impact of Legal Threats on Online Music Sharing
Activity: An Analysis of Music Industry Legal Actions, 49 J. LAW & ECON. 91, 92 (2006).

64. RIAA v. The People, supra note 6, at 1.
65. "Suing individuals was by no means our first choice. Unfortunately, without the
threat of consequences, far too many people were just not changing their behavior."
RIAA: For Students Doing Reports, supra note 1.
66. RIAA v. The People, supra note 6, at 2.
67. Robert Kasunic, Making Circumstantial Proof of Distribution Available, 18
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1145, 1147-48 (2008).

68.
69.

Id. at 1152-54.
Seidenberg, supra note 35.
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address of the user offering the song. 0 Initially, the RIAA was
sending subpoenas to Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") under a
provision in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") that
allowed this to occur without filing a lawsuit, showing proof of
infringement, or maintaining judicial oversight." In 2003, Verizon
Internet Services, Inc. and other ISPs were initially unsuccessful in
challenging this tactic to protect the privacy of their customers.
After the RIAA issued numerous subpoenas, the ISPs filed motions
to quash the subpoenas, but the motions were denied and the ISPs
were ordered to produce the names and addresses of subscribers
linked to the IP addresses thought to be engaging in illegal file
sharing.
After obtaining the names of users identified through these
subpoenas, the RIAA sent them letters threatening to sue if they did
not pay a settlement, which averaged $3,000. 74 Of the 204 letters
initially sent, 80 people were sued after refusing to pay the
settlement.75 Only a few months later, a federal appeals court
overturned the earlier decision, and determined that the DMCA did
not authorize the subpoenas. 76 By the time of this decision, the
RIAA had sent out over 3,000 subpoenas and had filed over 400
lawsuits against individuals.7 7 Despite the ruling that the subpoenas
were illegal, the lawsuits based on them were not dropped. 8
Following the DMCA subpoena decision, the RIAA adapted by
starting a new campaign of filing mass "John Doe" lawsuits, which did
not slow down the litigation against individuals, but placed it within
the procedures and oversight of the civil court system.9 Without the
authority of the DMCA subpoena powers, the RIAA was required to:
(1) locate IP addresses offering copyrighted songs on peer-to-peer
networks; (2) file lawsuits against multiple unknown "John Does;"
and (3) use the pending lawsuit to issue subpoenas to the ISPs to
determine the individuals who owned the IP address accounts. 80 Most
70. RIAA v. The People, supra note 6, at 2.
71. Id.
72. In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Subpoena Enforcement Matter, 393 F.3d 771, 773
(2005).
73.
74.

Id.
RIAA v. The People, supra note 6, at 3.

75.

Id.

76.
77.

RIAA v. Verizon, 351 F.3d 1229, 1236 (2003).
RIAA v. The People, supra note 6, at 3-4.

78.

Id. at 4.

79.

Id.

80. Id.
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of these lawsuits have ended in settlements ranging from $3,000 to
$11,000, while many others were decided on preliminary orders, such
as summary judgments, default judgments, and injunctions."
As mentioned above, one of the only lawsuits against an
individual file sharer to go to a jury trial is Capital Records Inc. v.
Thomas.82 In September 2008, the judge vacated the jury award of
$220,000 in statutory damages awarded in favor of the record
company plaintiffs, citing an error in the jury instruction about what
constitutes infringement of the distribution right under copyright
law.8 3 The original jury instruction stated that making copyrighted
material available to the public constituted distribution, as argued by
the RIAA. 4 Calling the "make available" theory into question
placed Ms. Thomas's case at the forefront of the federal circuit split
regarding this theory. Unfortunately, the case was retried on June 18,
2009, and resulted in a staggering $1.92 million award against Ms.
Thomas. 8 The make available theory was not addressed in the trial,
and Ms. Thomas's pending appeal focuses on the unconstitutionality
of the statutory damages. 86
III. Analysis
Of the tens of thousands of individual file sharers who have been
sued by the RIAA, very few have gone to trial, with the majority
settling out of court. Of the cases that have been considered by a
judge, there is an ideological split between the federal circuits as to
whether the "make available" theory constitutes distribution under
the Copyright Act. The primary case cited for support of the "make
available" theory comes from the Fourth Circuit and is accepted by
district courts in the Third and Fifth Circuits. 87 The main case cited
81. Id. at 5.
82. 579 F.Supp. 2d at 1212-13.
83. Id. at 1226-27.
84. Id. at 1213.
85. Posting of Fred von Lohmann to ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/06/record-labels-awarde (Jun. 18, 2009).
86. Id. See also posting of Corynne McSherry to ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/09/capitol-v-thomas-judge-orders-new-trial-implores-c
(Sept. 24, 2008) (noting that the judge questioned the constitutionality of the original,
lower jury award); Now that constitutionality of statutory damages is on front burner,
here's my brief on the subject, http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2009/
08/now-that-constitutionality-of-statutory.htmI (Aug. 22, 2009) (noting that Sony v.
Tenenbaum is also being appealed on the issue of constitutionality of statutory damages).
87. See, e.g., Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199
(4th Cir. 1997) (establishing the "make available" theory); Motown Record Co., LP, et al.
v. DePietro, 2007 WL 576284, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007) (3d Circuit accepting the
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for holding that distribution requires "actual dissemination" comes
from the Eighth Circuit and is followed by the First, Second, and
Ninth Circuits.'
A. Hotaling and the "Make Available" Theory
The "make available" theory originated in Hotaling v. Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, tried in the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1997. 9 In Hotaling, a single authorized copy of
genealogical research material, of which the Hotaling family owned

the copyright, was obtained for a Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints library in Salt Lake City, Utah.9 Subsequently, the
Church made multiple unauthorized copies and placed them in
several of their branch libraries around the country.9" At the location
where Mrs. Hotaling discovered an unauthorized copy, the
genealogical material "was part of the library's collection, listed in the
card file, and available to the public." 92 Because the library did not

keep records of its lending, there was no evidence of the copy being
distributed to the public. 93 However, the court did not find this fact to
be fatal to the case. 94 The judge declared that the mere making

available of copyrighted material, even without evidence that the item
was ever distributed, constitutes an infringement of the distribution
right of a copyright holder.95
Hotaling's holding in favor of the "make available" theory has
been given strong precedential authority in most cases decided in
favor of the RIAA, even in circuits not bound by the Hotaling
decision. One court likened the library's collection and card file
listing system to peer-to-peer networks, like KaZaA. 96

While the

theory); Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Payne, No. W-06-CA-051, 2006 WL 2844415 (W.D.
Tex. July 17, 2006) (5th Circuit accepting the theory); Arista Records LLC v. Greubel, 453
F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (5th Circuit accepting the theory).
88. See, e.g., Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426
(8th Cir. 1993); London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008)
(1st Circuit rejecting the theory); Elektra Entm't Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d
234 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (2d Circuit rejecting the theory); Atd. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554
F. Supp. 2d 976 (D. Ariz. 2008) (9th Circuit rejecting the theory).
89. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 201.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 203.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Payne, No. W-06-CA-051, 2006 WL 2844415, at *3
(W.D. Tex. July 17, 2006).
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library had physical possession of an unauthorized copy of the
copyrighted material, the defendant in a file sharing case allegedly
has unauthorized digital copies on a computer hard drive." Just as
the Hotaling court did not accept the excuse that the library did not
keep records of its lending, courts accepting the "make available"
theory do not acknowledge the excuse that no record is kept of file
sharing transfers.9 8 In one file sharing lawsuit, the record company
plaintiffs noted that such clear evidence as lending records or file
sharing logs is not expected in copyright infringement cases because
"[p]iracy typically takes place behind closed doors and beyond the
watchful eyes of a copyright holder.""
Additionally, courts that have accepted the "make available"
theory have reasoned around the statutory language of the Copyright
Act, which is ambiguous regarding the copyright holder's distribution
right.1 ° Because "distribution" is not defined in the Act, the Supreme
Court, in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,ruled
that distribution could be interpreted as synonymous with
publication, which is defined in the Act."'
According to the
Copyright Act, publication includes distributing and "offering to
distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes
of further distribution. 10 2 Even when one court admitted that, "[a]s a
general rule, distribution is accomplished by actual dissemination of
the copyrighted work," it still accepted the "make available" theory.103
More support for the "make available" theory comes from a
public policy background. The RIAA has argued that copyright
protection must include the "make available" right in order to comply
with the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO")
Copyright Treaty.'O°
In very unambiguous terms, the WIPO
Copyright Treaty, article 6, clause 1, reads: "[a]uthors of literary and
artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the making

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985).
102. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
103. Arista Records LLC v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969-71 (N.D. Tex. 2006)
(citing Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 434 (8th
Cir. 1993)).
104. Arista Records LLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 969 n.10.
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available to the public of the original and copies of their works
through sale or other transfer of ownership."' 5
In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the court conceded that
neither the United States Supreme Court nor the binding Court of
Appeals in the Third Circuit had "confirmed a copyright holder's
exclusive right to make the work available."' °6 However, without
even citing Hotaling, this court accepted the "make available" theory
based on a statement by the Register of Copyrights, Marybeth
Peters."'° Addressing this specific issue in file sharing cases in a letter
related to Congressional hearings, Ms. Peters declared, "making [a
work] available for other users of [a] peer to peer network to
download.., constitutes an infringement."'0'
Courts that accept the "make available" theory also cite past
decisions related to online file sharing. For example, Warner Bros.
Records, Inc. v. Payne"°9 cites A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster"° as
"holding that Napster users violated [the] exclusive distribution right
by uploading file names to the search index."".. In Warner Bros.
Records, the District Court for the Western District of Texas also
cited Interscope Records v. Duty"' as holding that the "mere presence
of copyrighted sound recordings in [the defendant]'s share file may
constitute copyright infringement."" 3 It should be noted, however,
that this holding is taken out of context, as it ignores the original
footnote to the subsequent sentence, clarifying that the court did "not
conclude that the mere presence of copyrighted sound recordings in
[the defendant]'s share file constitutes copyright infringement."...
The first statement was only meant to clarify the denial of the
defendant's motion to dismiss." 5
105.

WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 6(1), Apr. 12, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17

(emphasis added), available at 1997 WL 447232.

106. Motown Record Co., LP, et al. v. DePietro, 2007 WL 576284, at *3 n.38 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 16, 2007).
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Letter from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to Rep.
Howard L. Berman, Rep. From the 28th Dist. of Cal. (Sept. 25, 2002), reprinted in Piracy
of Intellectual Property On Peer-to-Peer Networks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Propertyof the Comm. on the Judiciary,107th Cong.

(2002)).
109.

No. W-06-CA-051, 2006 WL 2844415, at *3 (W.D. Tex. July 17, 2006).

110. 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (91_h
Cir. 2001).
111.

Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 2006 WL 2844415, at *3.

112.
113.
114.
115.

No. 05CV3744-PHX-FJM, 2006 WL 988086, at * 2 n.3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 14, 2006).
Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 2006 WL 2844415, at *3 n.3.
Interscope Records, 2006 WL 988086, at *2 n.3.
Id. at *2.
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B. National Car Rental and "Actual Dissemination"

While there is support for the "make available" theory, many
courts have rejected it in favor of the traditional, stricter
interpretation of the copyright distribution right, which requires
actual dissemination to prove infringement.16 One decision, often
cited as precedent for file sharing cases, that rejects the "make
available" theory is National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Computer
Associates International, Inc."7 Computer Associates argued that
National Car Rental violated its license agreement by using an
exclusive computer program for other companies outside of the
contract, and also infringed their copyright by making unauthorized
copies available to third parties.118 With regards to the infringement
claim, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held against the "make
available" theory, in favor of actual dissemination.119
Support for National Car Rental's holding came from the treatise,
Nimmer on Copyright, which states that "[i]nfringement of [the
distribution right] requires an actual dissemination of either copies or
phonorecords."' 2 ° The Ninth Circuit went a step further after
amending its views on the "make available" theory.'
In its recent
decision, the same court cited not only the Nimmer treatise, but also
Patry on Copyright and Goldstein on Copyright, all well-renowned
and highly regarded explanations of copyright law.1 22 William F.
Patry states that "[w]ithout actual distribution of copies of the [work],
there is no violation of the distribution right." 123 Paul Goldstein
further explains that "an actual transfer must take
' 24 place; a mere offer
for sale will not infringe the [distribution] right.'

116. See Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 434
(8th Cir. 1993); and subsequent case history, discussed infra.
117. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1223-24 (D.
Minn. 2008).
118. Nat'l Car Rental, Inc., 991 F.2d at 427-28.
119. Id. at 434.
120. Id. (citing MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8.11[A], at 8-124.1 (1993)).
121. See Interscope Records v. Duty, No. 05CV3744-PHX-FJM, 2006 WL 988086, at
*2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 14, 2006) (acknowledging a possibility that the "make available" theory
may be valid); then see At. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 987 (D. Ariz.
2008) (concluding that the court cannot expand copyright protection beyond what is in
Copyright Act).
122. Atd. Recording Corp., 554 F. Supp. 2d at 981.
123. Id. (citing WILLIAM F. PATRY, 4 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 13:9, at 13-13 (2007)).
124. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 2 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 7.5.1, at 7:125-26 (3d ed.
2009 supp.), cited in Atl. Recording Corp., 554 F. Supp. 2d at 981.
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Beyond the previously mentioned support for the "actual
dissemination" theory, other courts have rejected the "make
available" theory by exposing weaknesses in its underlying
arguments. For instance, a judge from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York pointed out that, "Hotaling did not
cite any precedent in holding that making copyrighted works
available to the public constitutes infringement."'25 Acknowledging
that the Hotaling court was probably motivated by equitable
even
principles, the S.D.N.Y. judge continued, "[t]his 1interpretation,
26
if sound public policy, is not grounded in statute."
Some judges have also attacked other courts' reliance on Harper
& Row to support an interpretation of distribution and publication as
synonymous. The U.S. District Court in the District of Massachusetts
pointed out that RIAA plaintiffs have mischaracterized the Harper&
Row holding, which was meant only to recognize the right of first
publication.' 2 The court added that this is a "far cry from squarely
28
holding that publication and distribution are congruent."'
Criticizing the logic behind the synonymous argument, the U.S.
District Court in the District of Arizona pointed out the logical
fallacy of using a word in its own definition. 129 That court further
clarified that the Copyright Act's definition of publication "makes
clear that all distributions to the public are publications, but it does
Copyright
not state that all publications are distributions."'30
authority Willaim F. Patry has also criticized courts for holding that
the words distribution and publication are synonymous, saying "[t]he
term 'publication' is defined ... as 'the distribution of copies. .. '[,

b]ut this doesn't mean the logic flows the opposite direction, that a
distribution is also a publication."' 3 '
In an amicus brief for the CapitolRecords, Inc. v. Thomas appeal,

several technology civil rights groups articulated a common statutory
argument: the courts must assume that an absence of certain words is

125. Elektra Entm't Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
126. Id.
127. London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 168 (D. Mass. 2008).
128. Id.
129. "Read as the record companies suggest, the definition would state that a
'distribution' is a 'distribution' or an 'offering to distribute.' One cannot assume that the
terms are absolutely synonymous in the face of such an unsatisfactory definition." Atl.
Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 985 (D. Ariz. 2008).
130. Id. at 984 (citing London-Sire Records, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 168-69).
131. Posting of William F. Patry, to THE PATRY COPYRIGHT BLOG, http://william
patry.blogspot.com/2008/04/recent-making-available-cases.html (Apr. 3, 2008,10:29 p.m.).

174

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[32:1

purposeful, if those words are present elsewhere in the statute. 132 The
distribution right in the Copyright Act grants the copyright holder the
right "to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease,
or lending."' 33 The amicus emphasized that "[w]hen Congress means
to prohibit offers to act, as well as the acts themselves, it has done so
expressly."34 The authors of the amicus brief read this reasoning to
support the claim that the language of the distribution right is
unambiguous, and therefore, does not merit expansion beyond its
plain language. 135

When the U.S. District Court in the District of Minnesota
ultimately decided to reverse its previous decision in Capitol Records
Inc. v. Thomas and reject the "make available" theory, it surveyed all

the competing arguments discussed above.'36
First, the court
determined the "plain meaning of the term 'distribution"' by looking
at the statutory language of the Copyright Act and secondary sources,
including the Nimmer and Patry treatises discussed above. 137

Next,

the court considered the Register of Copyright's statement in favor of
the "make available" right as merely persuasive, and the exclusion of
"offer to distribute" in section 106(3) of the Copyright Act as
intentional, in light of its inclusion in other sections of the Act.' 38
Similarly giving weight to Congress's specific choice of words, the
court rejected the argument that publication and distribution should
be interpreted as synonymous."'
Taking these and other arguments into consideration, the Thomas
court finally concluded that the "make available" theory is not good

132. Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Defendant, Capitol Records, Inc., v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No.
06-1497), available at http://beckermanlegal.com/Documents/virgin-thomas_080620
AmicusBriefEFFPubKnowlUSIAACCIA.pdf.
133. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006).
134. Brief for the Defendant, Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210
(D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06-1497) (citing examples inl7 U.S.C. § 901(a)(4) (where
semiconductor mask works are concerned, "to distribute means to sell, lease, bail, or
otherwise transfer, or TO OFFER TO sell, lease, bail or otherwise transfer"); 35 U.S.C. §
271(a) (exclusive right of patent owner reaches anyone who "without authority makes,
uses, OFFERS TO sell, or sells any patented invention ....
")).
135. Brief for the Defendant, CapitolRecords, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210.
136. See generally CapitolRecords Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210.
137. Id. at 1216-17.
138. Id. at 1217-18.
139. "Congress's choice to use both terms within the Copyright Act demonstrates an
intent that the terms have different meanings." Id. at 1220.
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law. 4 0 Not only did the court recognize that National Car Rental, and
not Hotaling, is binding precedent in the Eighth Circuit, it further
posited that "National Car Rental, not Hotaling, is consistent with the
logical statutory interpretation of § 106(3), the body of Copyright Act
case law, and the legislative history of the Copyright Act." 141
IV. Proposal
The problems associated with the RIAA's campaign of litigation
against individual file sharers are numerous and complicated. This
paper is focused specifically on a solution to the Federal Circuit split
over the "make available" theory of copyright infringement. Other
authors have written about alternatives to enforcing copyrights that
are more positive than lawsuits. 142 More civil rights oriented authors
have written about the invasion of privacy issues that result from the
"John Doe" filings 143 and from the RIAA's investigative methods
using services provided by MediaSentry.'" The constitutional validity
of levying excessive statutory damages against individuals for smallscale music piracy has also been questioned on due process
grounds. 145 As an alternative to legal music downloading services,
ideas have also been proposed to legitimize online file sharing that
create a new right to digitally transmit files 146 and that set up
alternative forms of compensation through ISPs to make
downloading legal.'47 Judge Davis, in his decision to vacate the
judgment against Ms. Thomas, implored Congress to re-evaluate
and
48
revise copyright law with regards to peer-to-peer file sharing.
The proposal offered in this note is meant to give relief to
defendants in pending lawsuits, as well as those of any future lawsuits

140. Id. at 1226-27.
141. Id. at 1225.
142. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 43; Nicholas M. Menasche, Comment, Recording
Industry Missteps: Suing Anonymous Filesharersas a Last Resort, 26 PACE L. REV. 273
(2005).
143. See generally Joshua M. Dickman, Anonymity and the Demands of Civil
Procedurein Music Downloading Lawsuits, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1049 (2008).

144. RIAA v. The People,supra note 6, at 7; MediaSentry is an investigative company
that locates and identifies IP addresses of alleged online infringers. Id. at 7.
145. Ms. Thomas's motion for a new trial was based on the assertion that the amount
of statutory damages awarded was excessive and in violation of the due process clause of
the U.S. Constitution. CapitolRecords Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
146. See generally Bennet Lincoff, Common Sense, Accommodation and Sound Policy
for the Digital Music Marketplace,2 J. INT'L MEDIA & ENT. L. 1 (2008).
147. RIAA v. The People, supranote 6, at 13-14.
148. Capitol Records, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1227-28.
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that will inevitably arise, considering the RIAA has already gone
back on their word and recommenced the litigation campaign against
individual fire sharers. 149 The split in the federal circuits over whether
to accept or reject the "make available" theory of distribution has
lead to unfair and unequal results over the past five years. It is
inherently inequitable that a defendant in California may have no
liability, while a defendant in Texas may be liable for thousands of
dollars in damages, though the two defendants engaged in nearly
identical conduct. This is especially egregious considering the
misinterpretation of copyright law being accepted to prove liability in
half of the circuits.
The legal analysis above considers both the "make available" and
the "actual dissemination" theories of what constitutes distribution
amounting to copyright infringement. While there is support in some
past decisions for the "make available" theory, it is all very weak and
not directly enough on point to support the RIAA's claims against
file sharers. Relying on Hotaling as precedent in peer-to-peer file
sharing cases should not be well-regarded by courts given the lack of
support for that decision. Arguing that distribution is synonymous to
publication in the Copyright Act, even though the word distribution is
in the definition of publication, hardly passes muster. The only
support for this illogical rationale has been taken out of context and is
not applicable to the present cases. Finally, while the opinion of the
Register of Copyrights and the provisions in the WIPO Copyright
Treaty are relevant and perhaps persuasive, they do not offer support
substantial enough for a court to reasonably make a ruling that is so
contrary to the statutory language of the Copyright Act.
Presently, there is a great necessity for a higher court to reject the
"make available" theory in the peer-to-peer file sharing context,
thereby setting binding precedent. Though there is a need for the
recording industry to find new ways to cope with how technology has
changed the face of the music marketplace, this should not be done at
the expense of justice. Courts facing pending controversies over the
theory should decide that the Copyright Act is not ambiguous enough
to allow the "make available" theory to persist. Vast amounts of
research and debate go into the legislative process indicating that
there is extensive consideration in each word choice. If Congress
intended "distribution" to have the same meaning as "publication,"

149. See RIAA claim not to have filed new cases "for months" is false, supra note 14;
Approximately 62 new cases filed by RIAA in April, http://recordingindustryvspeople.
blogspot.com/2009/05/approximately-62-new-cases-filed-by.html (May 10, 2009).
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then it would have used "publication" in 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), just as it
is used in other parts of the Act.
In order to fix this Federal Circuit split, a higher court needs to
take one of these cases. Currently, there has not been an RIAA
lawsuit against an individual that has moved past the district court.
However, it is imperative to establish precedent on the specific topic
of peer-to-peer file sharing claims of copyright infringement that will
bind district courts throughout the country. An alternative solution
lies with Congress. Congress can amend the Copyright Act to
prevent further confusion in the courts. If this were done, it is likely
that the law would be changed to explicitly disallow making
copyrighted materials available online. In addition, Congress should
go further and prohibit awards of excessive statutory damages against
individual peer-to-peer file sharers who clearly are not infringing for
mass commercial profits. Because the actual damages of individual
file sharing amounts to less than one dollar per song, awarding as
much as 80,000 times that is absurd and menacing. Either way, the
issue is of great importance to many parties, including: the individuals
who are being wrongly sued; all music fans, so they can know where
the law stands; and musicians, so they can feel secure that lawsuits
will no longer be filed on their behalf, but not to their benefit. Most
importantly, the courts must no longer be able to prolong the
legitimacy of an incorrect interpretation of copyright law.
V. Conclusion
The RIAA has spent the past decade fighting against emerging
technologies in the battle to protect their copyrights online. While
record companies have every right to enforce their copyrights
through legal means, it is contrary to public policy to terrorize
individuals with threatening settlement letters, and the RIAA should
be prohibited from doing so. In addition, the RIAA should be
prevented from imposing an improper interpretation of copyright law
through use of the court system. Because the RIAA sues online
music uploaders, the "make available" theory of copyright
infringement has been repeatedly argued in the courts and has often
prevailed. Although there is limited case law supporting the "make
available" theory of distribution, the arguments against the theory are
more compelling and are supported by an increasing number of
district courts, as well as the most renowned treatises on copyright
law.
The Jammie Thomas case is just one example of how the RIAA's
lawsuits have harassed and ruined the lives of thousands of
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individuals. To find the identities of the file sharers, the RIAA uses
sneaky tactics, some of which have already been deemed illegal and
others that soon may be. Further, imposing statutory fines meant for
large-scale copyright pirates on small-scale file sharers is unfair,
inequitable, and unproductive. To make matters worse, it is all in
vain. The litigation campaign was meant to have a deterrent effect on
illegal file sharing, but after years of these lawsuits, the number of
online file sharers remains steady and strong.
As with many emerging and ambiguous new areas of law, the
Federal District Courts are divided as to how to rule in the RIAA's
lawsuits against peer-to-peer file sharers. A higher court now has a
duty to review one of these cases, perhaps that of Ms. Thomas, and
set binding precedent by rejecting the "make available" theory. In
the alternative, Congress should amend the Copyright Act and put an
end to the split in federal district court decisions. One of the goals of
sound legislation is to clearly notify the public as to what their rights
and obligations are, and what they are allowed to do. As long as
there is a split along federal circuit lines, resulting in crippling
judgments in peer-to-peer file sharing cases against the citizens of
certain jurisdictions based on a grave misinterpretation of the law,
this goal can never be attained.

